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-In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 10284 
IN RE: GREEN RIVER ADJUDICATION 
v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
DAGGETT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT 
OPINION BELOW 
The district court did not write an opinion. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the district court was invoked by 
the Attorney General of the State of Utah under 
Chapter 4, Title 73, Utah Code ( 1953), to deter-
mine the rights to the use of all water, surf ace and 
underground, within the drainage area involved in 
(1) 
2 
this case. Jurisdiction over the United States was 
invoked under 43 U.S.C. sec. 666, and service was 
made upon the Executive Assistant to the Attorney 
General of the United States. Jurisdiction of this 
Court rests on Title 78-2-2, Utah Judicial Code, 
and on Rule 72 (a) , of this Court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the United States must conform to 
the requirements of the law of the State of Utah to re-
serve such water rights as are necessary for the 
utilization of reserved public land for the purposes 
for which the reservations were made. 
2. Whether a water right acquired by the United 
States may be subjected to exclusive use by third 
parties on the basis that they hold revocable per-
mits to graze on the public domain under the Taylor 
Grazing Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from the final decree of the 
district court adjudicating all of the rights to the 
use of water, surface and subsurface, within the 
drainage area involved. The United States was 
made a party pursuant to 43 U.S.C. sec. 666. 
In its response before the State Engineer, the 
United States asserted some 715 water users' claims 
concerning uses of the waters involved by the Bur-
eau of Land Management and the Bureau of Rec-
3 
lamation, both of the Department of the Interior, 
and the Forest Service of the Department of Agri-
culture. These claims encompassed rights acquired 
by appropriation under the laws of the State of 
Utah and, in addition, rights which are peculiarly 
federal in nature. Thus, the Government stated: 
As to the 715 claims submitted herewith, as 
well as future claims of the United States aris-
ing within the area of adjudication, the United 
States bases its claims upon appropriations 
made under Utah law and also upon such 
other rights under Utah law as may be valid; 
in addition, the United States bases such claims 
on its treaty-making powers, its requirements 
for flood control and navigation, its control of 
public and reserved lands, and any other ap-
plicable rights and powers under the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the Acts of Con-
gress, including, but not limited to, Section 24 
of the Act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat. 1103) 
and the Act of June 4, 1897 ( 30 Stat. 35-36), 
under the authority of which Acts there have 
been set aside from public lands ceded to the 
United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, 1848 (9 Stat. 922) certain forest re-
serves on which are situated the presently as-
serted uses of the Forest Service. 
In addition to the specific claims filed here-
with the United States also specifically claims 
all rights to use the waters of the Green River 
and its tributaries within the area of this ad-
judication proceeding that it may have by rea-
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son of the withdrawal of public lands within 
that area and the reservation thereof for Fed-
eral purposes, without regard to whether or 
not such waters may have heretofore been put 
to use upon the said reserved lands. With re-
gard to the 715 specific claims filed herewith 
the United States does not waive, but on the 
contrary hereby asserts, any and all priorities 
to which it may be entitled either by reserva-
tion of lands from the public domain or by 
appropriation under local laws and/or cus-
toms. 
The claims based on reservations of public lands 
filed on behalf of the Department of Agriculture 
were all within the confines of the Ashley and 
Wassatch National Forests. The reservation of land 
for these forests dates back to the Presidential 
Proclamation of February 22, 1897 (29 Stat. 895), 
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. sec. 4 71. See Executive Or-
der No. 884 of July 1, 1908; Presidential Procla-
mations of October 7, 1910 (36 Stat. 2750); June 
3, 1915 (39 Stat. 1732) ; May 3, 1926 ( 44 Stat. 
2611); April 2, 1930 (46 Stat. 3017); January 31, 
1933 (47 Stat. 2552); and February 18, 1933 (47 
Stat. 2555) . 
The proposed determination of the State Engi-
neer gave no recognition to the water rights assert-
ed by virtue of federal withdrawals of public land. 
In June 1962, objections were filed by the United 
States to certain specific determinations and to the 
failure to recognize the reserved rights as follows: 
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8. The United States further objects to the 
proposed determination of water rights filed 
by the State Engineer of the State of Utah on 
the ground that such proposed determination 
does not recognize or make provision for rights 
of the United States to use the waters of the 
Green River and its tributaries within the area 
of this adjudication proceeding that it may 
have by reason of the withdrawal of public 
lands within that area and the reservation 
thereof for Federal purposes, without regard 
to whether or not such waters may have hereto-
fore been put to use upon the said reserved 
land. 
On September 16, 1963, hearings were held by 
the district court on these and other objections 
which had been filed by interested parties to the 
proposed determination. The district court, at the 
opening of these hearings, denied the Government's 
claims to reserved rights, stating (Tr. 3): 
THE COURT: There were certain matters 
at pretrial here left to be determined. Is the 
United States Government here represented? 
Well, its claim to deal with water on its own 
preserves without complying with the state 
laws of Utah is denied. If the government is 
engaged in proprietary ventures, it must com-
ply with the laws of the state so far as I am 
concerned. Other courts may hold differently, 
but I won't so that issue is out. We don't need 
to bother about that. 
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The United States also asserted rights to use 
water under Water Users' Claims Nos. 265, 2716, 
2718 and 2719. Lee S. and Miranda Nebeker hold 
revocable grazing permits from the United States 
over the land issued by the Secretary of the Inter-
ior pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. 
sec. 315. In addition, the N ebekers asserted rights 
to the use of water based on certificates of appropri-
ation issued by the State Engineer's Office. The 
water users' rights claimed by the United States, 
however, preceded the rights claimed by the Ne-
bekers. 
The district court confirmed the proposed deter-
mination of the State Engineer in most respects 
in its decree entered June 13, 1964. That decree, 
in keeping with the district court's views expressed 
at the trial (supra, p. 5), rejected the claim of 
reserved rights asserted by the United States and 
stated: 
17. That all other protests to said determin-
ation, both oral and written that are before 
the court on this matter, are hereby dismissed. 
With respect to the conflict between the claims of 
the United States in Water Users' Claims Nos. 265, 
2716, 2718 and 2719, and those of the N ebekers, 
the court held: 
14. The rights to the use of water under 
Water User's Claims Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and 
2719 are affirmed in the name of the United 
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States of America as owner thereof subject to 
the right of Lee S. Nebeker and Miranda Ne-
beker to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the 
right for stockwatering purposes so long as 
they are holders of grazing permits on the pub-
lic lands where the use is made. Except as 
herein provided for the protest of Lee S. and 
Miranda Nebeker is dismissed. 
This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The United States Need Not Comply With the 
Laws of the State of Utah to Reserve Water by 
Withdrawal of Lands From the Federal Public 
Domain for a National Forest 
The district court clearly erred in denying the 
claims of the United States to the use of water on 
withdrawn public land sufficient for the require-
ments of the National Forest reservation. As the 
Supreme Court said in Winters v. United States, 
207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), "The power of the Gov-
ernment to reserve the waters and exempt them from 
appropriation under the state laws is not denied, 
and could not be." Winters held that the reserva-
tion of water sufficient to meet the future require-
ments of an Indian reservation was implied from 
the agreement establishing the Indian reservation. 
This principle extends to federal withdrawal of 
pub He land for other purposes as well. Very re-
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cently, the Supreme Court has specifically so held 
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963): 
The Master ruled that the principle under-
lying the reservation of water rights for In-
dian Reservations was equally applicable to 
other federal establishments such as National 
Recreation Areas and National Forests. We 
agree with the conclusions of the Master that 
the United States intended to reserve water 
sufficient for the future requirements of the 
Lake Mead Na ti on al Recreation Area, the 
Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the 
Imperial National Wildlife Refuge and the 
Gila National Forest. 
Indeed, the specific waters on the Ashley National · 
Forest have been so reserved. Glenn v. United 
States (Civil No. C-153-61, D. Utah), decided 
March 16, 1963 (a certified copy of the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were previously filed in 
this case). 
To the extent that waters within the National 
Forests are needed for the fulfillment of the pur-
poses of the reservation, they are not subject to ap-
propriation subsequent to the withdrawal date, 
1897. This does not preclude the use of these waters 
by others, so long as they are not needed for the 
reservation. The orderly way to administer such 
usage would be through the appropriative laws of 
the State of Utah. However, rights acquired there-
under would be vested only as against subsequent 
9 
appropriation by private parties and would remain 
subject to the right of the United States to use the 
water, if and when needed for the reservation. 
16 U.S.C. sec. 481 confirms this view. That sec-
tion provides: 
All waters within the boundaries of national 
forests may be used for domestic, mining, 
milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws 
of the State wherein such national forests are 
situated, or under the laws of the United 
States and the rules and regulations established 
thereunder. 
It is to be noted that this statute is permissive in 
nature. Thus, it provides that the waters "may be 
used" but does not purport to make a permanent 
disposition. In this connection, the permission or 
privilege is much like a grazing permit issued pur-
suant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. sec. 315, 
which, as we discuss under Point II, infra, creates 
no vested right against the United States but is a 
right protected against third parties. Osborne v. 
United States, 145 F.2d 892 (C.A. 9, 1944). 
The district court's ruling was, thus, plain error. 
This error could be cured without resort to an en-
tirely new trial by merely inserting a clause in the 
decree recognizing the reserved rights of the United 
States in and to these waters and making all sub-
sequent appropriative rights subject to the reserved 
rights. This would leave establishment of the extent 
of the reserved rights to future determination. This 
10 
is desirable because the federal reserved rights may 
expand if the Government's needs increase, even 
though those needs may be adequately satisfied now. 
II 
The Established Prior Right of the United States 
to Water May Not Be Subjected to Exclusive Use 
of the Water by the Holder of a Taylor Grazing 
Act Permit 
The district court's subjection of the United 
States' established prior water rights (Water Users' 
Claims Nos. 265, 2716, 2718 and 2719 to the Ne-
bekers' e~clusive use, while they hold grazing per-
mits, is an invasion of federal power to administer 
the federal range. A permit issued pursuant to the 
Taylor Grazing Act does not carry with it any 
right against the United States to use water. As a 
matter of fact, such a permit carries no rights of 
any nature against the United States and the Act 
specifically so provides ( 43 U.S.C. sec. 315b): 
So far as consistent with the purposes and 
provisions of this Act, grazing privileges rec· 
ognized and acknowledged shall be adequately 
safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing dis-
trict or the issuance of a permit pursuant to 
the provisions of this Act shall not create any 
right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands. 
This has been fully confirmed by the courts. United 
States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (C.A. 10, 1951), cert. 
den., 342 U.S. 867; Osborne v. United States, 145 
11 
F.2d 892 (C.A. 9, 1944); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 
428 (C.A. D.C. 1963), cert. den., 376 U.S. 907. 
The Secretary of the Interior has the duty and 
the responsibility to manage the federal range cre-
ated by the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. sec. 315. 
As set forth in the portion of the statute quoted 
above, recognized and acknowledged grazing privi-
leges will be adhered to, so far as consistent with 
the Act. This will also pertain to use of water on 
the federal range, whether the United States' right 
to the water be based on an appropriation under 
state law or upon the reservation at the time of the 
withdrawal. But, as we have shown in Point I, 
supra, such private water use is permissive and not 
mandatory and must always be subject to the fed-
eral interest in the management and operation of 
property of the United States. 
As stated in the Taylor Grazing Act, the primary 
purpose is "to promote the highest use of the public 
lands" ( 43 U.S.C. sec. 315) and, to accomplish this 
purpose, the Secretary of the Interior has issued 
regulations governing the use of the land and water 
of the federal range. 43 C.F.R. 4110 (The Federal 
Range Code). Under these regulations, it has fre-
quently been necessary to apportion the water and 
land of the United States among permittees, in 
order to make certain that both land and water are 
advantageously used. See Interior Grazing De-
cisions ( 1936-1938), e.g., pp. 44, 50, 125, 129, 168, 
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180, 190. The district court has limited the right 
of the Secretary of the Interior to manage the range 
by "vesting" in the N ebekers the exclusive right to 
the water in question, so long as they are permit. 
tees. While it is true that the Secretary could can-
cel the permits and thus vitiate the "right," there 
is no justification for leaving him only this extreme 
method of managing and, if need be, apportioning 
the use of the water in question among permittees. 
This error could be solved merely by inclusion of 
a provision that the N ebekers' rights are subject to 
all authority of the Secretary of the Interior under 
the Taylor Grazing Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be reversed. 
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